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ABSTRACT 
This paper provides a philosophical analysis of the Price equation and its role in 
evolutionary theory. Traditional models in population genetics postulate simplifying 
assumptions in order to make the models mathematically tractable. On the contrary, the 
Price equation implies a very specific way of theorizing, starting with assumptions that 
we think are true and then deriving from them the mathematical rules of the system. I 
argue that the Price equation is a generalization-sketch, whose main purpose is to 
provide a unifying framework for researchers, helping them to develop specific models. 
The Price equation plays this role because, like other scientific principles, shows 
features as abstractness, unification and invariance. By underwriting this special role for 
the Price equation some recent disputes about it and other evolutionary equations could 
be diverted. This move also links Price’s equation with Newton’s second law of motion, 
and therefore vindicates the Newtonian analogy.  
 
KEYWORDS: Price equation, generalization-sketch, abstractness, unification, 
Newtonian analogy. 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The Price equation, first presented by George Price at the beginning of the 1970s, is one 
of the key equations in evolutionary theory. Price believed that he had found an 
equation so special that it could describe any evolutionary situation and any 
evolutionary problem –in other words, Price developed an abstract way of theorizing 
and thinking about evolution. Nevertheless, this equation has been involved in a great 
dispute the last decade due to its special nature, after a long period of oblivion when it 
was used by very few researchers. Some authors (van Veelen 2005, van Veelen et al. 
2012, Nowak and Highfield 2011) claim that Price’s equation is not more than an 
identity and, therefore, is not even a model, so that its scope and power should be 
significantly reduced. On the other hand, a large number of researchers (see section 4) 
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have been using the Price equation in their theoretical and empirical work, developing 
models and analysing empirical data through it.      
In this paper, I offer a philosophical analysis of the ongoing controversy on the 
interpretation and significance of the Price equation. I argue that critics are right when 
they claim that the Price equation is not a model on its own. But at the same time, 
defenders of the Price equation are right when they use it in their research. I argue that 
this special character of the Price equation is due to what Thomas Kuhn (1970) called a 
“generalization-sketch”1. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 explores the traditional way of 
theorizing in population genetics and the use of diffusion theory. Section 3 introduces 
the Price equation and explains the key concepts it contains. Section 4 develops the idea 
of interpreting the Price equation as a generalization-sketch and its key features 
(abstractness, unifying power, invariance), explaining what special role play these sort 
of generalizations inside scientific theories. Section 5 exposes, firstly, the recent 
controversy surrounding the interpretation of Hamilton’s rule, and secondly how 
understanding the Price equation as a generalization-sketch helps to overcome the 
dispute. Section 6 argues that the Price equation follows a fundamentalist approach to 
theorizing, links it with Newton’s second law of motion, and therefore vindicates the 
Newtonian analogy.  
 
2. POPULATION GENETICS AND DIFFUSION THEORY 
Population genetics studies the genetic structure of populations and the causal 
factors, i. e. evolutionary forces, which act on populations changing allele and/or 
genotype frequencies (Gillespie 2004). Population genetics textbooks usually start 
formulating the Hardy-Weinberg law: a diploid and ideal infinite population, where 
there is random mating (panmictic population) and whose individuals are viable and 
fertile, will remain or return to equilibrium (i.e. allele and genotype frequencies will 
remain stable) if no force acts on it. Its simplest formulation says that for one locus with 
two alleles, A and a, with frequencies 	and  respectively, the frequencies for the three 
genotype (AA, Aa and aa) are , 2 and  respectively2. The Hardy-Weinberg law 
                                                          
1
 Structuralists (Diez and Lorenzano 2012) use the term “guiding principle”. I am not committed to the 
structuralism program and its formal apparatus. 
2
 The allele and genotype frequencies must add to 1, respectively:  +  = 1, and  + 2 +  = 1. 
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(Wakeley 2005) postulates six-dimensional space3: diploid organisms (	 = 2), infinite 
population size ( = ∞), no mutation ( = 0), no migration ( = 0), no selection 
( = 0), and random mating ( = 1). 
Therefore relaxing these assumptions, we can elaborate dynamic models in order 
to predict the allele frequencies provided that one or more evolutionary forces are acting 
on populations. For differences in fitness, that is, modifying the zero value for s, one of 
the simplest examples is one locus with two alleles, A and , with frequency  and  
(respectively), non-overlapping generations, and with constant genotypic fitnesses , 
, . The model deals with viability selection, where  is the average probability 
of survival from zygote to reproductive age. Assuming Hardy-Weinberg equilibrium 
before selection, the frequency of A in the next generation is 
 = 
 +
  
where   is the mean population fitness ( + 2 +). The expected 
change in the frequency of A is 
∆=  −  =   + 

 − 1 
In the same way, if we relax the infinite population size assumption postulating a 
finite population we can include drift. The basic model is the Wright-Fisher model 
(Gillespie 2004), a binomial sampling process in a diploid population in which a new 
generation is formed as a sample of 2 alleles4. The transition matrix for  copies of A1 
to  copies of A1 is given by: 
 !" = 2  

2
!
1 − 2
#$!
 
 
And we might continue relaxing some other assumptions in the Hardy-Weinberg 
law, including  mutation, migration, etc. The difficulties arise when we want to see how 
different evolutionary forces interact together upon a population. As far as we introduce 
more interacting forces, the complexity of the model increases, turning their 
mathematics less tractable. The basic problem is that we are dealing with deterministic 
processes as selection, migration, mutation and recombination, and also with stochastic 
                                                          
3
 Actually, Wakeley (2005) claims that there are five parameters, but I think migration should be also 
considered. So I introduce migration and I change parameters notation. 
4
 The model make the subsequent assumptions: there are non-overlapping generations; the population size 
is constant; there is no selection, mutation or migration; adults make an infinite number of gametes and 
every parent contributes equally to the gamete pool; all members breed; all members mate randomly.  
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processes like drift (here I follow Rice 2004). The consequence is that we cannot 
calculate with certainty the changes in a particular population, but only the probability 
distribution of populations. In order to do this we need, instead of using a discrete time 
model (like Wright-Fisher model), a continuous time model (continuous allele-
frequency approximation). The appropriate method is, then, diffusion theory that allows 
us to combine deterministic and stochastic processes. Diffusion equations, used 
originally in physics to describe the behaviour of molecules diffusing by random motion 
(Charlesworth and Charlesworth 2010), allow us to determine the change in the density 
probability using the mean and the variance of change in the allele frequency per 
generation. In order to make the model mathematically tractable, the diffusion 
approximation makes some simplifying assumptions: very large pool of gametes (large 
population size); mutations occur at the time of gamete production; selection operates 
on a large pool of the diploid offspring; selection, mutation, and migration are weak. 
The problem is that finding solutions for discrete models, like the Wright-Fisher 
model, is not easy and resolution of partial differential equations is much more 
advanced than discrete equations. So diffusion theory makes a transition from discrete 
to continue models when the population size tends to infinite ( ⟶ ∞). The 
Kolmogorov forward and backward equations are the basic mathematical models in 
diffusion approximations. The Kolmogorov forward equation characterizes population 
dynamics as  
 
&'(, ))
&) = −
&
& *'(, ))+(), +
1
2
&
& *'(, ))-(), 
 
where '(, )) is the probability density of populations with allele frequency  at time ),  
+ represents the probability distribution governed by deterministic forces (selection, 
mutation, migration), and - represents the variance in allele frequency due to non-
directional forces (drift). From this equation we can obtain specific equations 
combining several evolutionary factors, especially for equilibrium distribution (see Rice 
2004, chap. 5 for mathematical details). For example, for the equilibrium probability 
distribution of allele frequency under selection, mutation, and drift we obtain 
 
'. = /0$#123(1 − )4#156$74#153$7 
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where / is a constant,  the selection coefficient,  the mutation rate, and  the 
population size. Nevertheless, the diffusion approach has limitations, and these 
limitations are tied to the simplifying assumptions. When evolutionary forces as 
selection, mutation or migration are not weak, the quantity of gametes is low, and so 
forth, these models lose a great deal of their reliability, requiring computer simulations 
(Charlesworth and Charlesworth 2010). 
 
3. THE PRICE EQUATION 
All models exposed in the previous section, including all models in population 
and quantitative genetics in general, make a number of assumptions in order to simplify 
the target system under study. Nevertheless, there is another way, a simplifying-
assumptions-free model way to constructing theories. According to this approach, 
instead of starting with an idealized model containing deliberate simplifications, we 
begin by asking what is actually going on in the system, what are its basic properties 
and its appropriate mathematical principles. In evolutionary biology, the Price equation, 
also labelled as Price’s theorem, plays this role (Rice 2004, Frank 2012).  
Developed originally by George Price (1970, 1972), the Price equation describes 
the evolution of a population from one generation to another in a simple algebraic 
language. Price’s theorem is expressed in terms of covariances and expectations for 
describing evolution. There are equivalent derivations of the Price equation (Rice 2004, 
Frank 2012, McElreath and Boyd 2007, Okasha 2006) with slightly different notations, 
so I follow Frank’s standard derivation: think of a population where each entity is 
labelled by index  and each one has the character 8!, where  can be instantiated  by 
different elements (alleles, genotypes, phenotypes, group of individuals, etc.). The 
frequency of  elements in the overall population is denoted	!, and the average value of 
8 in the population (the arithmetic mean) is ∑!8!. So, if a descendant population has 
the traits 8! and frequencies !, then the change in average character value is ∆8̅ =
∑ !8! − ∑!8!. Let ! be the frequency in the descendant population, as the fraction of 
the descendants of the elements  in the parent population. Let ;! be the contribution of 
each  parent to the descendant population, i.e. the fitness of the th type. Therefore we 
can express ! as ! = <=>=>  where ; = ∑!;! is the average fitness. In a similar way, 8! 
refers to the average measurement of the property 8 of the descendants from ancestors 
with index , and the average trait value in the descendant population is 8̅ = ∑!8!. 
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Finally, we represent ∆! = ! − ! as the change associated with differential survival 
and reproduction and ∆8! = 8! − 8! as the property value change. Following these 
definitions, the Price equation expresses the total change in the average property value 
as  ∆8̅ = 8̅ − 8̅. Now we can substitute and derive: 
∆8̅ = 8̅ − 8̅ 
= ∑!8! − ∑!8!  
=?!( 8! − 8!) +?!8! −?!8! 
=?!( ∆8!) +?(∆!) 8! 
Switching the order of the terms and substituting and rearranging: 
∆8̅ =?! @;!; − 1A 8! +?!
;!
; (∆8!) 
Applying the standard definitions of covariance and expectation we obtain 
;∆8̅ = /BC(;, 8) + D(;∆8) 
This is the Price equation in its usual form in evolutionary literature. The first 
term on the right-hand side is the covariance between fitness ; and character 8, so is  
the change due to differential survival and reproduction. Usually this term is used as 
representing natural selection because give us an intuitive view of selection: if some 
entities in a population have a positive association between a character and fitness 
because that character gives them more chances to survive and reproduce to a certain 
selection pressure, the covariance will be positive. However, as the covariance term 
only measures the statistical association between the character and fitness, it says 
nothing about what causes this covariance and, therefore, it applies equally to drift (Rice 
2004). The second term on the right-hand side is the expected value (the average) of the 
quantity	∆8 weighted by fitness, that is, the change due to processes involved in 
reproduction. In other words, this term measures the relationship between parents and 
offspring, also called the transmission bias (Okasha 2006). This bias can be caused by 
mutation, recombination, selection at a lower level of organization, and so on.  
We can see that we have not specified what kind of entities are in our derivation, 
but we just stipulated a particular mapping between sets and their relationships. So there 
is no simplifying assumption or idealization of any kind in the Price equation. It is an 
abstract representation of entities in a population changing in time. The Price equation 
decomposes total evolutionary change in two terms, changes in frequency and changes 
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in property values. These total effects are attributed to different factors –actually, 
causes– as selection, drift, mutation, migration, etc. 
What makes the Price equation so powerful is its abstract nature and that we can 
derive from it the relevant mathematical equations found in the last century. For 
example, the covariance term for quantitative traits was found by Robertson (1966) and 
is known as the Secondary Theorem of natural selection. It says that the rate of change 
in a character equals the additive genetic covariance between fitness and character, 
;∆8̅ = /BCEE(;, 8). Also, we can obtain Fisher’s Fundamental Theorem of natural 
selection, which states that the rate of change in mean fitness equals the additive genetic 
variation in fitness. As fitness can be another character, we substitute the character 8 for 
fitness ; in the covariance term, and then ;∆; = /BCEE(;,;) = -EE(;). 
It seems that the Price equation has a special status, different from the other 
equations used in evolutionary theory. I will argue in the next section that the Price 
equation is a “generalization-sketch”, in Kuhn’s terms (1970). 
 
4. THE PRICE EQUATION AS A GENERALIZATION-SKETCH 
Kuhn suggested the existence of some generalizations in scientific theories which 
are “schemes” rather than simple laws, and these schemes should be specified for 
particular problems. These generalizations are usually expressed in mathematical form 
and play a programmatic role inside the theory: 
“generalizations [like f = ma…] are not so much generalizations as generalization-
sketches, schematic forms whose detailed symbolic expression varies from one 
application to the next. For the problem of free fall, f = ma becomes mg =
mds/dt. For the simple pendulum, it becomes mg sin α = −mds/dt. For 
coupled harmonic oscillators it becomes two equations, the first of which may be 
written O6P
3Q6
PR3 +	k7s7 = k(d + s − s7). More interesting mechanical problems, 
for example the motion of a gyroscope, would display still greater disparity between 
f = ma and the actual symbolic generalization to which logic and mathematics are 
applied” (Kuhn 1970, p. 465). 
Structuralists follow this idea as guiding principles and develop it with the notions 
of specialization and theory-net (Díez and Lorenzano 2012). It is quite natural that both 
philosophical traditions resort to classical mechanics and consider the second law of 
motion as the fundamental schema. We can see that Newton’s second law takes 
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different forms in order to solve specific problems, the puzzles with every physicist has 
to deal in her day-to-day work. These specific forms, as Kuhn claims, may change 
Newton’s second law in such a way that we cannot even capable to recognize it. This is 
what the paradigmatical examples (simple pendulums, pulleys, inclined planes, etc.) are 
for, they are used to familiarize physicists with the second law and hence, when they 
face a new problem, be able to find out a specific new form of Newton’s second law in 
order to compute any phenomena based on forces, masses and accelerations. This 
characteristic gives to the second law its power and makes it so fruitful.  
The value of these generalization-sketches is to be a “promise”, a driving principle 
for scientists whose work will be based on the abstract character of the principle and in 
their ability to transform an abstract schema into a concrete expression for particular 
cases. Thus, Newton’s second law guarantees that if we have any mechanical problem, 
there are some dynamical equation for it based on forces, masses and accelerations; and 
push us to work hard to find them. So generalization-sketches play a heuristic role and 
work as an abstract formalism awaiting for empirical application. I claim that the Price 
equation possesses these features and plays this role in evolutionary biology.  
4.1.Abstractness 
All authors stress abstractness as the fundamental feature of the Price equation. 
This characteristic allows it to be applied to any population (from bacteria to humans), 
no matter their specific features. The Price equation works as a schema, or in Okasha’s 
words: “So [the Price equation] it is not a model, but rather a schema that may be used 
to understand all other evolutionary models. [It is in recognition of this point that Rice 
(2004) deliberately talks about Price’s theorem, rather than Price’s theory (p. 68)]” 
(Okasha 2010, p. 426). More precisely, as a theorem the Price equation represents the 
consequence of particular mapping between sets and their relationships. The Price 
equation is a mathematical result or, in other terms, it is a mathematical identity. van 
Veelen (2005) and other authors (van Veelen et al. 2012, Nowak and Highfield 2011) 
have stressed this feature as a drawback for the Price equation and, therefore, not even 
considering it as a model. This controversy has echoes of those disputes about the 
meaning of Newton’s second law. Since it was formulated, Newton’s second law 
produced a long term discussion among physicists and philosophers about its empirical 
value (Sklar 2013, Barbour 2001). Some authors claimed that it should be considered a 
description of empirical situations while others, like d’Alembert and Mach, argued that 
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the second law was simply a definition of force (as we can find in some textbooks, see 
Corben and Stehle 1994, p. 28).  
In this case, there is no doubt that the Price equation is a theorem and, therefore, a 
mathematical identity. But it should be noted that, although the Price equation is a 
mathematical identity and therefore it follows from the definitions of the terms (it is a 
mathematical result), its underlying concepts are empirically grounded. Rice (2004, p. 
169) summarizes these concepts as: change over time, ancestor/descendant relations, 
and phenotype. In our world a population changes over time, it is possible to assign 
relations between ancestor and descendant, and we can identify the property of an 
individual (a phenotype) and represent it as a number. There is nothing a priori on these 
features.  
If I am right about the Price equation as a generalization-sketch, my approach may 
solve the problem set out by van Veelen and colleagues when they claim that the Price 
equation is not a model on its own. Actually, the Price equation is not a model, but a 
schema that provides a unifying framework in order to develop specific models. The 
Price equation alone cannot play any empirical role if it is not supplied by a specific 
model. In the same way, Newton’s second law tells nothing about what forces act on 
bodies, and needs to be supplied by specific models setting the forces and empirical 
information (masses, velocities, etc.). The Price equation works as a consequence law 
(Sober 1984). Sober describes two types of laws: source laws, which describe the 
circumstances that produce forces (such as Coulomb’s law or the law of gravitation), 
and consequence laws, which describe how forces, once they exist, produce changes in 
the system (such as Newton’s second law of motion). Thus, the Price equation describes 
how evolutionary forces produce changes in a population, but do not determine how 
many causes exists, how these causes are, and so on. In the same way, Newton’s second 
law works as a consequence law, it tells nothing about how forces arises only how to 
compute them when they are in a system.  
4.2.Unification  
From the Price equation we can obtain a great amount of important results in 
theoretical biology in the past century: Robertson and Fisher’s theorems, the breeder’s 
equation, etc. More important, if the Price equation play a role as a generalization-
sketch, new forms could be found in order to resolve new specific problems. Actually, 
that is exactly what happens in several branches of evolutionary biology (multilevel 
selection, epidemiology, non-genetic inheritance, biodiversity, etc.).  Many researchers 
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employ the Price equation as a unifying framework for analysing and elaborating 
specific models. In other words, the Price equation has become a generalization-sketch, 
a puzzles solver tool if the researchers are audacious and skilled enough to find some 
specific form for it. The Price equation has been applied for several disciplines briefly 
summarized5 (for equations based on Price’s equation see Tab. 1): 
 
• Selection processes. Since its first formulation by Price, the Price equation has 
been directly connected and developed for natural selection models. In section 
3 we have seen how key equations of natural selection, Robertson and 
Fisher’s theorems, can be derived directly from the Price equation. Other 
follow the same path: breeder’s equation (Frank 2012); replicator-mutator 
equation, adaptive dynamics and evolutionary game theory (Page and Nowak 
2002, Rice 2004); multilevel selection (Okasha 2006, Frank 2012, Gardner 
2014); kin selection theory, inclusive fitness and Hamilton’s rule (Frank 2013, 
Rice 2004, McElreath and Boyd 2007); and so on. Special mention deserves 
Grafen’s long term work (Grafen 2007, for an outline), called “The formal 
Darwinism project”. Grafen’s aspiration is to establish a mathematical link 
between population genetics and optimization programs, in other words, 
between see natural selection as a mechanism that change gene frequencies 
and conceptualizing natural selection as a fitness-maximisation mechanism 
that produces design. For this task of linking, Price’s equation plays a crucial 
role due to its generality, and because “The Price equation places individuals 
at the center of its technical apparatus” (Grafen 2007, p. 1245). 
• Stochastic evolution. The Price equation, in its classic form, is a total 
description of evolutionary change because takes both present and future 
states as given or, in other words, is a deterministic description of 
evolutionary change. Nevertheless, sometimes all the parameters cannot be 
specified exactly, before reproduction (or any future state) has taken place. In 
this case, evolution turns out a stochastic process and then, some parameters 
should be changed to random variables. Thus, Rice and collaborators (Rice 
2008, Rice and Papadopoulus 2009; but see also Grafen 2000) have 
developed a stochastic version of the Price equation that can deal with random 
                                                          
5
 The most relevant bibliography is reviewed but not intended to exhaust it.  
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variables as stochastic fitness and stochastic migration, demographic 
stochasticity or random environmental change. Following this path, Engen 
and Saether (2013) analyse how demographic and environmental stochasticity 
generate random genetic drift and fluctuating selection. 
• Ecology. Fox and collaborators (Fox 2006, Fox and Haporle 2008, Fox and 
Kerr 2012) extend and use the Price equation as a general framework for 
biodiversity and ecosystem function, analyzing differences in ecosystem 
function between sites. Collins and Gardner (2009) develop a new form of the 
Price equation in order to express the total change at the community level as 
the sum of the separate effects of physiological, evolutionary and ecological 
change, providing a way for integrating and linking these three different 
levels. Ellner et al. (2011) study how evolution, non-heritable phenotypic 
change and environment affect ecological dynamics, developing a continuous-
time version of the Price equation that they call “Genotype-Phenotype-
Environment equation”.   
• Epidemiology. Day and Gandon (2006 and 2007) deal with the evolutionary 
and epidemiological dynamics of host-parasite interactions focusing on a 
continuous model of pathogen evolution, providing a continuous-time 
derivation of the Price equation with mutation. This can be generalized to 
multiple habitats and as a formalism to model the evolutionary dynamics of 
pathogen populations (for example, S-I-R model). Thus, using the Price 
equation as a framework, Day and Gandon offer a way to integrate different 
theories of host-parasite interactions. Based on this approach, Alizon (2009) 
develops a framework that combines within-host population dynamics 
models, population genetics, theory and data, to study disease intrahost 
evolution for any parasite trait. Alizon argues that “This Price equation 
framework has four advantages: (i) it helps to identify how (and which) trade-
offs can affect within-host evolution; (ii) it allows for predicting the short-
term evolutionary dynamics of a trait from the genetic composition of the 
parasite population in the host; (iii) it helps link theory and data; and (iv) it 
can be applied to most existing models of within-host population dynamics” 
(Alizon 2009, p. 1124).   
• Non-genetic inheritance and proximate causes. Modern Synthesis based their 
mathematical and empirical results on genetic inheritance. However, other 
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non-genetic systems of inheritance may have a causal role on evolution.  
Halenterä and Uller (2010) use the Price equation for analysing and gathering 
four different inheritance systems (genetic, epigenetic, behavioral, and 
symbolic) on a common framework. Day and Bonduriansky (2011) developed 
several evolutionary models based on the Price equation that unifies the 
effects of genetic and non-genetic inheritance (nontransmissible 
environmental noise, indirect genetic effects, transgenerational epigenetic 
inheritance, RNA-mediated inheritance, etc.). Otsuka (2015) develops a 
unified framework to translate “proximate causes” (such epigenetic 
inheritance, maternal effects, niche construction) into “ultimate evolutionary 
response” based on the Price equation and causal graph theory. El Moulden et 
al (2014) explore how cultural transmission can be conceptualized as 
evolutionary systems, using the Price equation as a unifying framework, 
analyzing how cultural and genetic evolution interact but also differentiating 
each other.  
These are some of the most important and interesting investigations, but not unique6, 
using the Price equation as cornerstone.  
4.3. Invariance 
The Price equation shares with other scientific principles the feature of invariance 
or symmetry, the property of remaining unchanged under some transformation. For 
instance in Cartesian axes, for Newton’s laws of motion, we can shift a coordinate 
system to a new point or change the orientation of the axes, and the bodies motion will 
stay the same. Therefore Newton’s laws are invariant “with respect to translations 
(shifting of the origin) and rotations” (Barbour 2001, p. 30).  
Steven Frank has been the first author to show what kind of invariances contains 
the Price equation. For that he connects the Price equation, written in covariances and 
expectations, with information theory, overcoming the problem of representing 
nonlinear processes with statistic language. Thus, Frank (2009) relates Fisher 
information (a measure of distance between two probabilities distributions) and 
Shannon information (entropy) with the properties of natural selection, and gives an 
                                                          
6
 Other works are: Kerr and Godfrey-Smith (2009, extending the Price equation for migration); Gardner 
et al. (2007, relating multilocus population genetics and social evolution); Coulson and Tulkjapurkar 
(2008, extending the Price equation for age-structured); and Gardner 2015, Grafen 2015, Taylor 2009, 
Rebke 2012, for study populations composition (class-structured populations, decomposition, etc.) 
expressed with the Price equation.  
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expression of the Price equation in terms of Fisher information (see tab. 1). More 
recently, Frank (2012) developed these ideas demonstrating different identities for the 
evolutionary change caused by selection in the Price equation, relating the covariance 
term with notions as information and geometry, where covariance is taken as a measure 
of distance (see Frank 2012 for mathematical details). In this way, Frank claims: 
“for any particular value for total selection, there is an infinite number of different 
combinations of frequency changes and character measurements that will add up 
to the same total value for selection. All of those different combinations lead to 
the same value with respect to the amount of selection. We may say that all of 
those different combinations are invariant with respect to the total quantity of 
selection” (Frank 2012, p. 1007).  
In other words, the covariance term allows us to evaluate selection completely since it 
does not matter how frequency changes and character measurements are combined. All 
this infinite number of combinations equals the total quantity of selection, remaining 
unchanged, and so they are invariant. In addition, this evaluation is complete because 
the covariance is taken as a measure of distance (i.e. as a measure of information) and 
not as is usually used in statistics and, therefore, being applied also for nonlinear 
processes.  
 
 
 
Price equation in terms 
of Fisher information 
(Frank 2009) 
8̅T = 8̅TU + 8̅TV∣U 
Selection identities 
(Frank 2012) 
 
 
∆28̅ = /BC(;, 8)/;  = ;XY>-(;/;) = ∆Z · \ 
=∥ ∆Z ∥	∥ \ ∥ ^B _ 
= ;XY>(∆Z` · ∆Z`) = ;XY>a(∆Z`) 
 
Robertson’s theorem ;∆8̅ = /BCEE(;, 8) 
Fisher’s theorem ;∆; = -EE(;) 
Breeder’s equation 
(Frank 2012) b = cℎ 
Path analysis (Frank 
2012) ;∆8̅ = X>Y-(8) + X>e/BC(f, 8) 
Replicator-mutator Price 
equation (Page and DT () = /BC(g, ) + D(T) + D(g∆h) 
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Nowak 2002) 
Hamilston’s rule (Birch 
2014) i − ^ > 0 
Stochastic evolution 
(general equation) (Rice 
2008) 
∆_kl = ^BCm_n ,l opq + ^BCr(_n , o)kkkkkkkkkkkkkkk + s̅ 
 
Demographic 
stochasticity (Rice 2008) 
 
ct ≈ ^BC(_, ;`)v(;) −
^BCm_, C(;)q
;.  +
^BC(_, wx(;))
;. x  
Random environmental 
change (Rice 2008) ct ≈ ^BC(_, ;`)v(;) −
^BC @_, gyC(;z)A
;.  +
^BC(_, gywx(;z))
;. x  
Stochastic fitness and 
stochastic migration 
(Rice and Papadopoulus 
2009) 
∆_kl = {| _nE}, opE ~ +≪ _nE , oE ≫kkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkkk+ sEkkkkl+≪ , 	
≫ +k @ − sEkkkkl A 
Fluctuating selection and 
drift (Engen and Saether 
2013) 
 = $7 + $7 + $7E 
Difference Ecosystem 
Function (Fox 2006) ∆ = 8̅∆ + c(;, 8) +?;!∆8!!
 
Collins/Gardner equation 
(2009) ∆8̅ = D @D!m∆8!"qA + D @^BC!m;!", 8′!"qA+ ^BC(;!, 8!) 
Genotype-Phenotype-
Environment equation 
(Ellner et al. 2011) 

) =
&
&8 
8̅
) − D*∆8, +
&
&8 D*∆8, +
&
&

)  
The Price equation with 
mutation (Day and 
Gandon 2006) 
̅T = ^BC(, ) − w(̅ − ̅h) 
The Price equation to 
multiple habitats (Day 
and Gandon 2006) 
̅T  = ^BC(, ) − w(̅ − ̅h ) + 

 ^BC
(, )
+ 

 
$(̅ − ̅) 
Nongenetic inheritance 
Price equation (for 
overlapping generations) 
(Day and Bonduriansky 
2011) 
∆ℎk = /BC(, ℎ) + D(i∆ℎ) + D(∆ℎ) 
Interactions  genetic and 
nongenetic inheritance 
(Day and Bonduriansky 
2011) 
∆̅ = Xm̅, ℎkq + Xm̅, ℎkq + 1 D(i∆
)
+ 1 D(∆
)
 
Epigenetic inheritance 
(Otsuka 2015) ∆̅ =
1
 X
 + !  + C(Dk − /̅) 
Maternal effects (Otsuka 
2015) ∆̅ =
1
 X*
 + h , + (̅U − ̅) 
Niche construction 
(Otsuka 2015) ∆̅ =
1
X̅ + b	(X + )

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Cultural Price Equation 
(El Moulden et al 2014) ∆8̅ = ^BC(^, 8) + D (∆8) 
The Price equation with 
migration (Kerr and 
Godfrey-Smith 2009). 
∆k = ^BC	m/¡∗, q + C0((∆)E) − ^BC	m/¡E∗, Eq 
Age-structured Price 
equation (Coulson and 
Tulkapurkar 2008) 
∆̅()) = /BC(	, b)(, ))bk(, ))  
Tab. 1. Identities, derivations and extensions of the Price equation, respectively. 
 
 
5. HAMILTON’S RULE AS A CASE 
Hamilton’s rule is an inequality developed by William Hamilton inside kin 
selection theory. Its aim is to explain the evolution of social behaviour in populations. 
Hamilton’s rule states that a social behaviour will be favoured by natural selection if 
and only if i − ^ > 0, where  represents the genetic relatedness of the recipient to the 
actor, i the benefits to the recipient, and ^ the costs to the actor (Davies et al. 2012). 
Notwithstanding, Hamilton’s rule and kin selection theory in general  are recently under 
dispute because some authors like Nowak et al. (2010, p. 1059) claim that Hamilton’s 
rule “almost never holds”, while evolutionary biologists like Gardner et al. (2011) 
maintain a strong position for the correctness and the unrestricted applicability of 
Hamilton’s rule. 
In a recent paper, Birch (2014) argues that discussions about Hamilton’s rule arise 
because there are two possible versions of it. One version comes from evolutionary 
game theory, and is based on the one-shot two-players Prisioner’s Dilemma (van Veelen 
et al. 2012). Birch labels it as the special version of Hamilton’s rule (HRS), and is 
characterized by its simplifying assumptions. A consequence of these simplifications is 
that the applicability of HRS is constrained to very specific cases and cannot handle 
more complicated ones (for example, when the frequency of cooperators matters). Is in 
this sense that Nowak and collaborators claim that Hamilton’s rule “almost never 
holds”. The other version comes from the Price equation (Frank 1998). It is not tied to 
any simplifying assumption and fits to any social behaviour system because it follows a 
priori from the Price equation. Birch labels it as the general version of Hamilton’s rule 
(HRG). It is this version that Gardner and collaborators have in mind when they defend 
the generality of Hamilton’s rule. Here is the problem: if HRG is always true then it is 
difficult to see how Hamilton’s rule keeps its explanatory power (Gardner and 
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colleagues’ aim); and if we are content with HRS then we lose predictively power 
because it is not widely applicable.  
Nevertheless, thinking of the Price equation as a generalization-sketch may clarify 
this issue. The question is how HRG, which derives directly from an abstract 
mathematical theorem, can give us any details about which particular social behaviour 
will evolve by natural selection. The answer is clear: it cannot. The reason is that HRG 
is a derivation of the Price equation and plays the same role as a generalization-sketch, 
except that in this case it is applied to social behaviour. In other words, no empirical 
information is supplied by HRG, only says that a social behaviour will be favoured by 
natural selection when i − ^ > 0. Put another way: if there is some social trait in a 
population, look for the genetic relatedness of the recipient to the actor, the benefits to 
the recipient, and the costs to the actor. If these relations are greater than zero (they are 
positive) then natural selection favoured this trait in the population. This is how a 
consequence law works. But the source of these relations will be related to specific 
populations (paper wasps, meerkats, ground squirrels, prairie dogs, etc.), and concrete 
predictions will be provided by specific models and, therefore, subject to simplifying 
assumptions. HRS is precisely a specific model subject to simplifying assumptions and 
then it only makes valid predictions in particular situations. Birch detects these two 
different roles played by HRG and HRS when he says: “We therefore face a trade-off. 
By construing Hamilton’s rule as HRG rather than HRS, we buy generality at the 
expense of predictive power” (Birch 2014, p. 400). On the other hand, other HRG’s 
characteristic, detected by Birch but omitted by Nowak and colleagues, is the 
explanatory value of unification: “HRG constitutes a unifying principle: a means of 
bringing together results from disparate models under a single conceptual framework”. 7 
This unifying power of the Price equation, and then also of HRG, has been stressed in 
the present article as one of its key features. 
However, the problem is that, if we are seeking the most general framework for 
all the processes of social evolution under natural selection, it seems that it would be 
better to use Robertson’s theorem of natural selection. My reply is different from Birch 
and is based on the hierarchical structure view of the theory. HRG is derived from the 
Price equation firstly by leaving aside the second term, and resting only the covariance 
term. As we have seen in section 3, the covariance term was developed by Robertson 
                                                          
7
 Birch 2014, p. 401. Kitcher (1993, chap. 2) underlined the unifying power of the theory of natural 
selection as its greatest explanatory value.  
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and it is known as the secondary theorem of natural selection. So it is true that 
Robertson’s theorem is more general than HRG, but HRG is a special form of this 
theorem focused on the evolution of social behaviour. Robertson’s theorem tells us 
when a trait, in general, will be favoured by natural selection, whereas HRG tells us 
when a social trait will be favoured by natural selection. Thus, if we are focused on 
social behaviour, using HRG is sufficient to produce specific models.      
 
6. A FUNDAMENTALIST APPROACH 
The use of the Price equation as a generalization-sketch implies a very specific 
way of theorizing: we start with postulates or assumptions that we think are true and 
then derive the mathematical rules of the system. Rice and Papadopoulus (2009) call 
theories that follow this way of theorizing “axiomatic theories”, where postulates or 
assumptions are the axioms of the theory. Philosophers of science conceptualize this 
kind of thinking as “fundamentalism” (Cartwright 1999) where “scientists [are] guided 
by a commitment to find fundamental concepts and principles sufficient for providing a 
universal and unified account of nature” (Waters 2011, p. 232)8. For the fundamentalist 
approach universality is the goal, and according to Cartwright one clear example of this 
approach is Newton’s second law of motion and the aspiration to encompass all 
dynamical processes through all forces acting upon bodies or, in other words, that  there 
is a mechanical model for any dynamical situation. 
A fundamentalist approach seeks generality, finding the mathematical expressions 
that encompass all the special models and allow us to produce more special ones. At the 
core of an axiomatic theory lies a unifying framework and, at the same time, a formula 
in order to produce specific models. When a special model is formulated, simplifying 
assumptions are necessary for acquire predictive power or dynamic sufficiency, but 
these simplifications come at the end of the theoretical work, and not at the beginning.    
6.1. The Newtonian analogy vindicated 
Textbooks and most of the evolutionary literature talk about evolutionary forces 
acting on a population (Gillespie 2004, Templeton 2006). Sober (1984) developed this 
                                                          
8
 The aim of Water’s article is to show that Okasha’s book (2006) favours a “toolbox view” (which aim is 
finding partial descriptions and denies a unique correct description) based in his analysis on multi-level 
selection and the appropriateness of the Price equation versus Contextual analysis, although Okasha 
devoted the first chapter of his book to the benefits of Price’s equation (Okasha 2011 for a reply). 
However, there is no confrontation between the Price equation and contextual analysis because the latter 
is a form of path analysis which “follows as a natural extension of the Price equation (…) It does not 
make sense to discuss the Price equation and path analysis as alternatives” (Frank 2012, p. 1014).     
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point of view according to which evolutionary theory is a theory of forces in the same 
way that different forces of Newtonian mechanics cause changes in the movement of 
bodies, because evolutionary forces cause changes in trait frequencies. A lively debate 
about the appropriateness of the forces analogy has been developed in the last decade 
(Matthen and Ariew 2002, Hitchcock and Velasco 2014). I think that most of these 
attacks to the Newtonian analogy have been positively answered so, I will not go into 
detail about them. Rather I want focus on a particular contention on the force 
interpretation since Sober formulated it: that evolutionary theory does not contains any 
law or equation comparable with Newton’s second law of motion. Thus, only two years 
after the publication of Sober’s book, John Endler wrote:   
“First, if natural selection is a “force,” what is it acting on? (A force is meaningless 
without an object). If natural selection were a force, it should be possible to 
decompose it into a mass and an acceleration. In this case “acceleration” is 
phenotypic selection, but what is the “mass”? The “mass” could be a frequency 
distribution or the genetic system (condition c, inheritance), but this is tantamount to 
assuming that natural selection applies only to groups. Natural selection arises from 
biological differences among individuals (condition b, fitness differences); therefore 
to make a proper analogy, the “mass” is the genetic composition of an individual. 
This is reasonable because it also allows mutation to be a “force”. But the “mass” in 
the physicist’s a =  is a class of objects with defining properties and not an 
individual, so the analogy either breaks down or restricts natural selection to group 
selection” (Endler 1986, p. 31). 
And most recently,  
“[T]he Newtonian analogy does not work (…) We do not build evolutionary 
models by beginning an analog of the force equation expressing Newton’s 
second law of motion (a£ = £, where a£is the force,  is the mass, and £ is the 
acceleration) and substituting for the force term” (Sarkar 2011, p. 464). 
Nevertheless, the present article demonstrates that evolutionary theory counts with 
an equation comparable to Newton’s second law of motion. Both equations share 
several key features like abstractness, unifying power, and invariance. In turn, the Price 
equation and the second law of motion work as consequence laws, computing all 
possible causes in a common framework in evolutionary theory and in Newtonian 
mechanics, respectively. Actually both equations share a family resemblance, for 
example in cases of equilibrium. When two evolutionary forces, represented by the 
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covariance term and the expected term respectively, are acting upon a population with 
equal magnitude but opposite sign, we obtain ;∆8̅ = 0, i. e. −D(;∆8) = /BC(;, 8). In 
the same way, when two forces (a1 and a2), are exerted on a body with the same 
magnitude but opposite sense, we have 0 =  · , i. e. a2 = −a1. This shows that, 
contrary to Endler and Sarkar’s claim, evolutionary forces can be expressed by 
covariance and expectations and not as a clumsy copy of Newton’s second law trough 
masses and accelerations. It is fair to say that this kind of model building with the Price 
equation, in a way analogous to the second law of motion, is relatively recent9. In this 
line, the effort of Steven Frank (1995, 1997) to spread Price’s work was crucial. This 
shift is an issue for sociology of science and that question goes beyond the purview of 
this paper, but I guess that the initial dismissal of the Price equation lies probably in the 
reluctance of many (field) biologists on mathematical works (a complain supported by 
Grafen (2007)). Be that as it may, the present article and the works cited show that 
many evolutionary biologists have taken the Price equation as a unifying framework, in 
a similar way as physicists in the eighteenth century took Newton’s second law of 
motion. van Veelen and colleagues (2010, 2012) repeatedly complained that the Price 
equation is usually considered by many evolutionary biologists as D = ^ is 
considered by physicists; rather the Price equation is like Newton’s second law.        
 
7. CONCLUSION 
My aim in this paper was to show the special nature of the Price equation and the 
role it plays in evolutionary theory. I have argued that the Price equation has all the 
characteristics of a generalization-sketch: (i) it is a schema that allows for elaborating 
specific models with concrete symbolic expressions, (ii) it shares with other scientific 
principles such features like abstractness, unifying power and invariance, and (iii) many 
researchers are actually using it as a generalization-sketch. Understanding Price’s 
equation in this way solves many problems stated by van Veelen and colleagues on the 
supposed role it plays in evolutionary theory, and also with other related equations like 
Hamilton’s rule. Furthermore, attributing this role to the Price equation –i.e. a 
generalization-sketch– favours a specific way of theorizing (an axiomatic or 
fundamentalist approach) in evolutionary biology and relates it with other 
                                                          
9
 Although, early approaches were developed by Hamilton (1970, 1975), Seger (1981), Grafen (1985), 
and Wade (1985), among others.  
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generalization-sketches like Newton’s second law of motion. This is a case, in the end, 
for vindicating the Newtonian analogy.   
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